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O'CALLAHAN V. PARKER-MILESTONE OR
MILLSTONE IN MILITARY JUSTICE?
ROBINSON 0. EVERETT*
Under the decision of the Supreme Court in O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), a court-martial was held to have no
jurisdiction to try the accused, an Army sergeant, where the offenses
in question occurred off-post, during the accused's off-duty hours
while on leave with an evening pass, and while the accused was in
civilian attire. In decisions since O'Callahan, the United States
Court of Military Appeals has further construed the standards of
that case, holding that courts-martial lack jurisdiction over offenses
unconnected with military service and triable in civilian courts. In
this article the author analyzes the opinions in O'Callahan, criticizes
the Court for its apparent failure to consider the full impact of the
decision on military justice, and calls for the reversal of O'Callahan
at the earliest opportunity.
Military lawyers wore long faces on the afternoon of June 2, 1969.
The Supreme Court had just handed down its decision in
O'Callahan v. Parker' to the effect that courts-martial lack
jurisdiction to try military personnel for offenses that are not
"service-connected." Perhaps even more depressing was the failure
of Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a five-member majority, to
acknowledge the considerable reforms that had been made in "so-
called military justice.''2
Admittedly the result in O'Callahan was not completely
unexpected by judge advocates and by many others. Years before, a
provocative article had noted that for decades courts-martial lacked
jurisdiction in peacetime to try civil type offenses and had argued
that the expansion of military jurisdiction in the twentieth century
constituted an unauthorized contraction of the constitutional rights
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. A.B. 1947, LL.B. 1950, Harvard
University; LL.M. 1959, Duke University.
1 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
2 Id. at 266 n.7.
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of military personnel.3 At the 1962 Hearings of the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Dean A. Kenneth Pye, a leading expert on military law, commented
that "as a matter of constitutional law, it is questionable whether
courts-martial should have the power to try civilian-type offenses,
and as a matter of desirability it is also questionable whether they
should have this power." 4 The very fact that the Supreme Court
had granted certiorari was ominous, and the tenor of the argument
had not been encouraging to those who favored military
jurisdiction5 However, very few, either within the military justice
system or outside, were fully prepared for the opinion of the Court
delivered in O'Callahan.
THE OPINIONS IN O'CALLAHAN
O'Callahan, then a sergeant in the Army, was stationed at Fort
Shafter, Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii. On the night of July 20,
1956, "while on leave with an evening pass" petitioner and a friend
left the post dressed in civilian clothes and went into Honolulu.
After a few beers, O'Callahan allegedly entered a penthouse
apartment at the Reef Hotel and assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl
who was in bed there.6 While fleeing from her room, he was
apprehended by a hotel security officer, delivered to the Honolulu
city police for questioning, and finally turned over to the military
police. Subsequently he made a confession and was tried by court-
martial on charges of attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault
with intent to rape in violation of Articles 80, 130, and 134 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Convicted on all charges, he
3 Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Arny: Another Problem of Court-
Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REV. 435 (1960).
' Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, Hearings Be/bre the Subconmmittee oil
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Contnittee on the Judiciary', 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 552-53
(1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings]. The American Legion recommended that
civilian courts have priority of jurisdiction in peacetime over offenses of a civil nature
committed off a military reservation and that former Article of War 92 be reenacted to
prohibit trial by court-martial of certain capital civil offenses, such as rape and murder.
**wherever a State or Federal court is functioning." Id. at 422-25. Colonel Frederick Bernays
Wiener. an eminent authority on military law whose book CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY
JUSTICE (1967). was relied on in Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan, testified at the
same hearings that he did not believe courts-martial were constitutionally prohibited from
trying civil-type offenses. 1962 Hearings, supra at 778-79, 784-86. However, he considered it
"the part of wisdom to restrict military jurisdiction to occasions that affect military
discipline. But I don't think it is a constitutional limitation." Id. at 785-86.
This observation is based on the author's discussion with persons who had heard the
argument before the Supreme Court.
395 U.S. at 260.
10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930 & 934 (1964).
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was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment at hard labor, forfeiture
of all pay and allowances, and dishonorable discharge.
The conviction was affirmed by an Army Board of Review and
the Court of Military Appeals. Almost a decade after his
conviction, O'Callahan filed a petition for a writ of error coram
nobis in the Court of Military Appeals, in which he contended that
the reception of deposition testimony at his trial had violated his
constitutional rights. The court did not find it necessary to decide
this contention since it concluded that his "guilt was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence other than the depositions
and the use of the latter was not prejudicial to him."' 8 Apparently
he did not urge in the Court of Military Appeals that the court-
martial had lacked jurisdiction to try him for non-military offenses
committed off-post while not on duty.
Prior to seeking extraordinary relief from the Court of Military
Appeals, O'Callahan had filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the federal district court for the district wherein he was
confined; and, upon denial of relief, he appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the court below.
Certiorari was granted on the question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10
U.S.C. § 801 et seq., have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed
Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian
court and having no military significance, alleged to have been committed
off-post and while on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional rights to
indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court?,
Since the "Articles of War" and other legislation were
superseded in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice0 and
O'Callahan was tried in 1956, the phrasing of the question is
technically inaccurate. More importantly, the phrase "having no
military significance" in one sense begs the question; a major
argument for military jurisdiction is that, because of discredit to
the service and impairment of relationships between the military
and nonmilitary communities, there is "military significance" to
United States v. O'Callahan, 18 U.S.C. M.A. 568, 569, 37 C.M.R. 188, 189 (1967).
393 U.S. 822 (1968) granting certiorari: the court of appeals opinion is reported in 390
F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
'- 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964). The Uniform Code of Military Justice took effect on
May 31, 1951, Act of May 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 108.
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an incident where a soldier, whether or not in uniform, breaks into
an apartment at night and assaults a young girl.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court for
himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Brennan, and
Marshall, pointed out that Congress is empowered to "make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces,"" and that under the fifth amendment "cases arising in the
land or naval forces" are exempt from the requirement of
prosecution by indictment. 2 On the other hand, for a case that does
not arise in the land or naval forces, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of an indictment by grand jury and trial by jury as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment and by Article III, section 2 of
the Constitution.
After quoting a passage from Toth v. Quarles"3 contrasting trial
by court-martial with that available from an Article III court
presided over by a judge with life tenure, the opinion noted that a
court-martial is "empowered to act by a two-thirds vote; its
presiding officer is not a judge whose objectivity and independence
are protected by tenure and undiminishable salary and nurtured by
the judicial tradition;" and it is subject to "substantially different
rules of evidence and procedure.' 4 Furthermore, there are dangers
of command influence by "the officer who convenes it, selects its
members and tie counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct
command authority over its members."'"
While recognizing the need for a system of specialized military
courts, Mr. Justice Douglas reiterated the admonition from Toth
that because of "dangers lurking in military trials . . . . [flree
countries ... have tried to restrict military tribunals to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among troops in active service."' 6 Commenting that
"courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing
with the nice subtleties of constitutional law,"' 7 the opinion
t U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 14.
12 As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out, citing Exparte Quirin. 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942), the
fifth amendment exclusion of "cases arising in the land and naval forces" has been
construed to apply also to the sixth amendment right of trial by jury. 395 U.S. at 261.
13 350 U.S. 11I, 17-18 (1955).






intimated that Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,"8 which had been the basis for one of the charges against
O'Callahan, is unconstitutionally vague. To emphasize the need for
restricting military jurisdiction, the principal opinion referred to
"so-called military justice" and "the travesties of justice
perpetrated under the 'Uniform Code of Military Justice.' "9
Mr. Justice Douglas further noted that the decisions holding
that court-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach any
person not a member of the Armed Forces at the times of both the
offense and the trial do not establish the quite different, proposition
that any offense committed by a person on active duty in the
Armed Forces may be made subject to trial by court-martial
regardless of the "lack of relationship between the offense and
identifiable military interests. ' 20 While status is necessary for
jurisdiction, it does not follow that ascertainment of status
completes the inquiry.
The opinion referred to British practice, whereunder at the time
of the American Revolution a soldier could not be tried by court-
martial for a civilian offense committed in Britain, and concluded
that the "early American practice followed the British model."
Even the "general article"-predecessor of the present Article
134-which punished "[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders
and neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the
prejudice of good order and military discipline" had been
interpreted, according to Mr. Justice Douglas, "to embrace only
crimes the commission of which had some direct impact on
military discipline. t21 During the Civil War there had been
legislation providing for military trial of certain civil offenses, but
it applied only "in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion;" and not
until 1916 were the Articles of War revised to authorize military
trial, even in peacetime, of various civil-type offenses committed by
persons "subject to military law.' 
22
" 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964). For a study of some of the case law under this Article, see
Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness. 37 N.C.L.
REV. 142 (1959).
"1395 U.S. at 266. Here the opinion quotes from Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy. 12
COLUM. F. 46, 49 (1969). See also Levy v. Parker, 90 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1969) (Douglas, J.
sitting as Circuit Justice).
395 U.S. at 267.




With respect to the power conferred on Congress to make
"Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," the opinion assumed that "an express grant of general
power to Congress is to be exercised in harmony with express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights."23 Noting the broad range of
crimes that are within the scope of Article 134,24 Mr. Justice
Douglas concluded that
we see no way of saving to servicemen and women in any case the
benefits of indictment and of trial by jury, if we conclude that this petitioner
was properly tried by court-martial.
In the present case petitioner was properly absent from his military base
when he committed the crimes with which he is charged. There was no
connection-not even the remotest one-between his military duties and the
crimes in question. The crimes were not committed on a military post or
enclave; nor was the person whom he attacked performing any duties
relating to the military. Moreover, Hawaii, the situs of the crime, is not an
armed camp under military control, as are some of our far-flung outposts.
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming
from the war power. Civil Courts were open. The offenses were committed
within our territorial limits, not in the occupied zone of a foreign country.
The offenses did not involve any question of the flouting of military
authority, the security of a military post, or the integrity of military
property.
We have accordingly decided that since petitioner's crimes were not
service connected, he could not be tried by court-martial but rather was
entitled to trial by the civilian courts.7
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, joined by Justices Stewart and
White, interpreted the Supreme Court precedents to mean that
military status is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. The dissenting opinion
disagreed with the majority's analysis of the English and early
American practice concerning trial of military personnel for civil
type offenses; nor did it concede
as a general matter that the constitutional limits of congressional power are
coterminous with the extent of its exercise in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. . . . The disciplinary requirements of today's armed force of over
I ld. at 273.
2 in this regard, the opinion cites R. EVERETT. MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FoRcEs OF
THE UNITED STATES 68-69 (1956), and comments that "[w]e were advised on oral argument
that Article 134 is construed by the military to give it power to try a member of the armed
services for income tax evasion." 395 U.S. at 273.
15 395 U.S. at 273-74.
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3,000,000 men are manifestly different from those of the 718-man army in
existence in 1789.26
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Harlan accused the majority of ignoring
"strong and legitimate governmental interests which support the
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction even over 'nonmilitary'
crimes. ' 27 For example, there is
a vital interest in creating and maintaining an armed force of honest,
upright, and well-disciplined persons, and in preserving the reputation,
morale, and integrity of the military services. . . . The commission of
offenses against the civil order manifests qualities of attitude and character
equally destructive of military order and safety . . . . A soldier's misconduct
directed against civilians, moreover, brings discredit upon the service of
which he is a member .... 28
The dissent further suggested that trial by court-martial is more
consistent than civil court trial with "rehabilitating offenders to
return them to useful military service" and that a "soldier detained
by the civil authorities pending trial, or subsequently imprisoned, is
to that extent rendered useless to the service,"29 while this may not
be the case if his offense is disposed of within the military justice
system. Finally, the dissent criticized the "uneasy state of affairs"
which had been created by the failure of the majority opinion to
"explain the scope of these 'service-connected' crimes as to which
court-martial jurisdiction is appropriate . . . . "
A CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
The first criticism of the majority opinion in O'Callahan v.
Parker concerns the very fact that it was rendered by the Supreme
'Court as constituted on June 2, 1969. At that time Mr. Justice
Fortas had already resigned from the Court, leaving only eight
members. Chief Justice Warren, who joined in the majority
opinion, had announced his impending retirement. The views on
military jurisdiction stated by then-Circuit Judge Warren Burger in
his dissent in United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy3 1 suggest
28 Id. at 280.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
I d. at 282.
Id. at 283. The dissent criticized the majority opinion for intimating that, in some
instances, "as a constitutional matter the military is without authority to discipline an
enlisted man for an offense that is punishable if committed by an officer." Id. at 283 n.1 I.
31 295 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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that he would have favored the position of.the dissenters in
O'Callahan. Thus, it was readily foreseeable on June 2, 1969 that
the views of Mr. Justice Douglas might not-indeed, probably
would not-command a majority when the Fall Term commenced.
However, under Rule 58 of the Supreme Court Rules it would be
almost impossible for the Government to secure a rehearing."
Thus, the decision in O'Callahan would proclaim the law on
military jurisdiction at least until it would be overruled in some
other case.
Under the circumstances it would have been far preferable if the
Court had set the case for reargument in the fall, instead of
proceeding to invalidate well-established principles as to the scope
of military jurisdiction. However, the Government must share the
blame, since presumably it could have moved for reargument after
it became clear that the impending change in Court membership
would probably improve its chances for success.
A second criticism of the majority opinion is that it departs
markedly from well-entrenched precedents. The ultimate irony is
that only a few months earlier Mr. Justice Douglas also had
authored the opinion in United States v. A ugenblick.3 There the
Supreme Court reversed a Court of Claims decision that
Augenblick's court-martial was invalid because of violations of the
Jencks Act. And yet, under the reasoning of O'Callahan, the
jurisdiction of a court-martial to convict him of committing an
indecent, lewd, and lascivious act in violation of Article 134 would
seem questionableW1
In 1960 the Supreme Court decided four cases concerning
2 The petition must be submitted within twenty-five days after the decision. Moreover, a
petition for rehearing may only be granted at the instance of a Justice who concurred in the
judgment or decision and with the concurrence of a majority. Sup. CT. R. 58, 388 U.S. 987-
88 (1967).
- 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
3 In Augenblick. the accused, a Navy commander, was not on duty when the offense took
place, was not in uniform, and it was not known that he was in the Navy until civilian
authorities had charged him with disorderly conduct. The alleged offense did not concern
performance of his military duties. It took place outside of any military installation in the
District of Columbia. The victim, although an airman, was off duty and did not know
Augenblick was a naval officer. There was no flouting.of military authority, and military
property was not involved. The accused was convicted under Article 134 of the Uniform
Code, although charged under a different article. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7.9,




military jurisdiction over civilians0 5 The Court's conclusion there
that courts-martial could not be constitutionally empowered to try
civilian employees or dependents for offenses committed overseas in
peacetime does not imply that service personnel may be tried by
court-martial for offenses that are not "service-connected."
However, some of the comments seem to assume that military
status would suffice to create military jurisdiction without regard to
the type of offense involved. Thus, in McElroy v. United States
ex rel. Guagliardo,6 where the Court was considering the cases
of a civilian employee who had been convicted of larceny from
an air depot in Morocco and of a civilian auditor, who had
been convicted of three acts of sodomy in Berlin, the opinion of the
Court suggested as a "practical alternative" the incorporation of
"those civilian employees who are to be stationed outside the
United States directly into the armed services, either by compulsory
induction or by voluntary enlistment. '37 There would be little
reason for the Court to suggest this alternative if it would not
confer jurisdiction for a court-martial to try offenses of the type
there involved s
Earlier precedents evidence the Supreme Court's assumption
that military jurisdiction to try service personnel is not limited by
the type of offense involved. Thus, in Ex parte Quirin, the Court
observed:
The exception from the Amendments of 'cases arising in the land or naval
forces' was not aimed at trials by military tribunals, without a jury, of such
offenses against the law of war. Its objective was quite different-to
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Wilson v. Bohlender,
361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex
rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 .(1960). These cases and their antecedents are discussed in
Everett, Military Jurisdiction over Civilians, 1960 DuKe L.J. 366.
-s 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
"Id. at 286.
31 In the same context, the Court added: "Although some workers might hesitate to give
up their civilian status for government employment overseas, it is unlikely that the armed
forces would be unable to obtain a sufficient number of volunteers to meet their
requirements. The increased cost to maintain these employees in a military status is the price
the Government must pay in order to comply with constitutional requirements." Id. at 287.
Of course, one and perhaps both of these cases involved offenses that might well be "service-
connected" under O'Callahan. Moreover, the offenses arose overseas and it has not yet been
established that O'Callahan applies extraterritorially. Thus, these dicta about military status
can be distinguished away; but the reader does get the distinct impression that once military
status is established, military jurisdiction exists.
Vol. 1969:853]
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authorize the trial by court-martial of the members of our Armed Forces for
all that class of crimes which under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments might
otherwise have been deemed triable in the civil courts. The cases mentioned
in the exception are not restricted to those involving offenses against the law
of war alone, but extend to trial of all offenses, including crimes which were
of the class traditionally triable by jury at common law. Ex parte Mason,
105 U.S. 696; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8-9; cf Caldwell v. Parker,
252 U.S. 376.z9
In O'Callahan the majority relies on rights conferred by the fifth
and sixth amendments; and yet in Ex parte Quirin the Court
concluded that the exception in the fifth amendment for "cases
arising in the land or naval forces" was intended to eliminate
those rights-even in cases which were triable by jury at common law.
In Kahn v. Anderson0 the Supreme Court upheld the
jurisdiction of a court-martial which had tried the accused for a
murder he allegedly committed while a military prisoner. The trial
had begun on November 4, 1918, and had finished November 25,
after the Armistice. The Court did not inquire whether the offense
was "service-connected."
Ex parte Mason" concerned a soldier on guard duty who had
been tried for killing a prisoner. Prosecution was under Article 62
of the Articles of War, this being a "general article"-a
predecessor of Article 134 of the Uniform Code-which punished
conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. Upholding
the jurisdiction of the court-martial, the Supreme Court observed
that
[t]he act done is a civil crime, and the trial is for that act. The proceedings
are had in a court-martial because the offender is personally amenable to
that jurisdiction, and what he did was not only criminal according to the
laws of the land; but prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the army
to which he belonged4
Clearly the offense involved was "service-connected" since the
accused had been performing guard duty; however, the Court
placed no reliance on that fact and instead seemed to predicate
jurisdiction on his military status.
This precedent was relied on by the Supreme Court in Grafton
v. United States 3 in disposing of a problem of double jeopardy.
:9 317 U.S. i, 43 (1942) (emphasis added).
40 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
' 105 U.S. 696 (1882).
Id. at 700.
* 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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The accused had been prosecuted for homicide in a civil court in
the Philippines, although previously acquitted by general court-
martial. Apparently the acts-the killing of two Fililinos-were
committed on a military reservation. The Court ruled that Grafton
was entitled to protection from double jeopardy if the court-martial
had the jurisdiction to try him, and jurisdiction did exist under
Article of War 62 since, as the Court put it:
The 62d article of War, in express words, confers upon a general, or a
regimental garrison, or field officers' court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, jurisdiction to try 'all crimes' not capital,
committed in time of peace by an officer or soldier of the Army. The crimes
referred to in that article manifestly embrace those not capital, committed
by officers or soldiers of the Army in violation of public law as enforced by
the civil power. No crimes committed by officers or soldiers of the Army
are excepted by the above article from the jurisdiction thus conferred upon
courts-martial, except those that are capital in their nature. While, however,
the jurisdiction of general courts-martial extends to all crimes, not capital,
committed against public law by an officer or soldier of the Army within
the limits of the territory in which he is serving, this jurisdiction is not
exclusive, but only concurrent with that of the civil courts!'
In Coleman v. Tennessee 5 the Supreme Court was inquiring
whether a state court could try a serviceman for murder. However,
it was not questioned that the military courts had jurisdiction;
instead the only issue was whether this jurisdiction was exclusive.
As the Court noted:
In denying to the military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction, under the section
in question, over the offenses mentioned, when committed by persons in the
military service of the United States and subject to the articles of war, we
have reference to them when they were held in States occupying, as members
of the Union, their normal and constitutional relations to the Federal
government, in which the supremacy of that government was recognized,
and the civil courts were open and in the undisturbed exercise of their
jurisdiction. When the armies of the United States were in the territory of
insurgent States, banded together in hostility to the national government and
making war against it, in other words, when the armies of the United States
were in the enemy's country, the military tribunals mentioned had, under the
law of war, and the authority conferred by the section named, exclusive
jurisdiction to try and punish offences of every grade committed by persons
in the military service.4
"Id. at 348.




Similarly, the Court observed in Carter v. McClaughry that
[ulnder every system of military law for the government of either land or
naval forces, the jurisdiction of courtsmartial extends to the trial and
punishment of acts of military or naval officers which tend to bring disgrace
and reproach upon the service of which they are members, whether those
acts are done in the performance of military duties, or in a civil position, or
in a social relation, or in private business; 7
Admittedly, this passage applies directly only to officers, and the
Court's opinion in O'Callahan, discussing a large number of courts-
martial for civil offenses in the early days of the United States,
noted:
Those few which do appear to involve civilian crimes in clearly civilian
settings appear also to have been committed by officers. In the 18th century
at least the "honor" of an officer was thought to give a specific military
connection t6 a crime otherwise without military significanceia
However, Carter v. McClaughry was decided in the present
century; and furthermore the distinction between officer and
enlisted man does not seem to have sufficient constitutional
dimensions to allow the court-martial of the former, but not the
latter, for a civil-type offense.
The majority opinion is predicated on the need to provide the
serviceman the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and trial
by petit jury. As to the former, it is significant that the Supreme
Court has not yet expressly overruled Hurtado v. California,9
which held decades ago that fotreenth amendment due process
does not require indictment by grand jury. Thus, to the extent that
state courts try cases which heretofore would have been tried by
"183 U.S.365, 401 (1902), quoting from Smith v. Whitney, i f-U.S. 167, 183-84 (1886).
" 395 U.S. at 270 n.14. The famous treatise of Colonel Winthrop, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920), reveals that many civil-type offenses had been punished as
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman pursuant to then-Article of War 61. See Id.
at 710-20. See also Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 180 (1886). Conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman is prohibited by Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964). Officers are also singled ouft for punishment in Article'88 of the
Code, which punishes any officer who uses certain contemptuous 'words against certain
officials. .10 U.S.C. §888 (1964). However, the history of military enforcement by court-
martial of an especially high standard of behavior by officers would probably not suffice to
permit court-martial of an officer for an offense that would not be "service-connected" if
committed by an enlisted man. In his dissent in United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545,
40 C.M.R. 257 (1969), Chief Judge Quinn emphasized that "I, therefore, attach no
significance to the fact that this accused is a commissioned officer whereas O'Callahan was
an enlisted man." Id. at 551 n.1,40C.M.R. at 261 n.l.
- 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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courts-martial, there is no assurance that the accused will receive
the benefit of an indictment. Moreover, neither in federal not state
courts does the grand jury procedure provide an accused with
discovery of the prosecution's case as is afforded to servicemen
pursuant to Article 32 of the Uniform Code. Indeed, in many
instances the grand jury is more of a sword for the Government
than a shield for the defendant.
There is no point in minimizing the importance of trial by jury.
However, it should be remembered that the serviceman frequently is
not from the same community which furnishes the jury for the state
or federal court where he may be tried. Indeed, he may be viewed
by .that community as a hostile intruder. On the other hand, he
may have considerable rapport with the members of the military
community from whom the court-martial personnel would be
selected. 50 Thus, even trial by jury may be a less valuable right for
the serviceman than for many of his civilian counterparts.
In O'Callahan the Court was justifiably concerned with evils of
command influence exercised on members of courts-martial.
However, both Congress and the Court of Military Appeals have
been alert to dangers in this area. t Furthermore, in civil life there
are "horror stories" of improperly selected juries and grand juries
to match the instances of command influence in the military.
52
The majority opinion in O'Callahan does not i*ake clear
whether non-service-connected offenses may be tried by court-
martial if committed overseas. The cases involving military
jurisdiction to try civilians overseas have established that
constitutional guarantees may apply extraterritorialy. 3 And, it' a
court-martial is precluded from trying a serviceman for an offense
in the United States which is not service-connected because such a
trial would violate his rights, it is not evident why such rights
would be any less violated if the trial occurred overseas. Moreover,
fCf. R. EVERMT, supra note 24, at 5-6.
5, The cases referred to in footnote 5 of the majority opinion involve instances where the
convictions were reversed because of command influence. Congress recently amended Article
37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964), to expand the
prohibitions against command influence. At least in theory, exercise of command influence
would be punishable under Article 98 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. § 898 (1964).
52 See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559
(1953); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
11 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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a civil-type felony would not be more service-connected if
committed in Germany instead of in Alabama, unless it is assumed
that some possible impact on foreign relations adds "service-
connection" to the offense.
If a serviceman is not tried overseas for an offense which is not
service-connected, he either will be tried by a foreign court or will
not be tried at all. In the latter event, there will be no need for
constitutional safeguards; in the former, the accused will not receive
them and will be tried without the benefit of grand jury indictment
or petit jury determination of guilt5 Thus, in terms of abstract
legal rights-whether or not this holds true as to practical
results 55-the serviceman may be in a worse position under the
O'Callahan rule than he was previously
The Supreme Court may avoid this consequence by holding that
Congress" constitutional power under Article I, section 8,
clause 14, "to make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces," encompasses the power
to punish by court-martial a crime of whatever nature if committed
by a seryiceman overseas. In support of this conclusion it could be
argued that the absence of American civil tribunals overseas
necessitates the use of courts-martial to maintain discipline under
circumstances where trial by court-martial would be
constitutionally forbidden in the United States. Thus, in
authorizing such trials, Congress would be exercising "the least
Very few foreign courts provide for jury trial. Even England, which retains trial by jury
in criminal cases, has abolished the grand jury.
The unavailability of rights that would be afforded in an American civil court or court-
martial may be offset by the relatively light sentences that the foreign courts impose on
American military personnel. Therefore, in many instances the serviceman might prefer to be
tried in a foreign court rather than an American court of any kind. Cy. R. EVERETT, supra
note 24, at 40-46.
" There is little practical remedy for this situation. To create extraterritorial jurisdiction of
federal district courts to try crimes committed overseas by military personnel might raise a
constitutional problem as to the power of Congress to enact such legislation. See Everett,
supra note 35, at 388-89. Moreover, the American court would have no subpoena power in a
foreign country and could not assure the presence of witnesses for the accused or for the
government. Id. at 375-76. Under treaties, such as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
the provisions for waiver of jurisdiction by a host country contemplate waiver of jurisdiction
for trial of a serviceman by a military tribunal, rather than by a civil court. Thus, the host
country would have no obligation or occasion to waive any jurisdiction it possessed in order
to permit trial in an American civil court, even if that court possessed extraterritorial
jurisdiction over the offense. See J. SNEE & A. PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT:
CRIMINAL JURIS ICTION 24-33 (1957).
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possible power adequate to the end proposed," as required by Toth
v. Quarles5
7
If the effect of O'Callahan is limited on a territorial basis, then
the thrust of the preceding criticism will have been blunted. But
until that possibility becomes a reality-which may involve
considerable adroitness on the Court's part-the majority opinion
in O'Callahan must be viewed as a triumph of abstract concepts
over practical realities.
The picture which Mr. Justice Douglas paints of courts-martial
is so bleak as to create a natural reluctance to place service
personnel within their clutches. However, the picture is far too one-
sided. To illustrate, courts-martial excluded the fruits of
unreasonable searches and of wiretapping long before state courts
were compelled to do so5 Courts-martial have afforded protections
as to resentencing which are not yet fully available in civil courts5
Military investigators are subject to a warning requirement that
was a model for the Miranda rule.'" Discovery of the prosecution's
case is more available than in a state or federal court." Qualified
defense counsel were furnished without charge to accused in courts-
martial for some time before they were required for indigents in
state courts. 2 Appellate review of sentence appropriateness is
57 350 U.S. II, 23 (1955), where the Court cited in support Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821).
'- Compare MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 152 (1951) with Mapp v.
Ohio,'367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), noted in 1968 DUKE
L.J. 1008.
" Under Article 63 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice the sentence imposed at the
first trial constitutes a ceiling on sentence in the event of a rehearing. 10
U.S.C. § 863(b) (1964). In Pearce v. North Carolina, 393 U.S. 973 (1969), however, the
Supreme Court ruled that the first sentence is not an absolute bar to an increase in sentence.
11 Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires that anyone who is
..accused or suspected" of a crime must be informed of its nature and told that he need
make no "'statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected" but that
anything he does say "may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial." 10
U.S.C. § 831 (1964). The Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) relies in part on the military practice. Subsequently, the court of appeals extended to
military investigations the Miranda requirement that the suspect be warned of his right to
counsel. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
1, Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 & 17 with MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES 44h (1951).
" Appointment of defense counsel is dealt with in Article 27 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice; the record of trial, in Article 54. 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 854 (1964). In Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court held that counsel must be furnished without
charge in state courts to indigents who could not afford to retain their own counsel in a case
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provided in the military justice system, but is generally unavailable
in state and federal courts." Courts-martial apply liberal rules of
mental responsibility."
Although Justice Douglas may consider trial by court-martial
to be "substantially different" from trial in a civil court, 5 the
Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the President to
prescribe a
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial ...
which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of'law
and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts, but which shall not be contrary to or
inconsistent with this chapter. 6
The Manual for Courts-Martial,. in its various editions, has provided
for a court-martial procedure which accords with this mandate from
Congress, .and so courts-martial are now far less alien institutions
than Justice -Douglas recognizes.
The majority opinion in O'Callahan does strike a sore spot in
its criticism of Article 134 67-the "general article"-which allows
punishment of conduct to the prejudice of good order, service-
discrediting conduct, and crimes and offenses not capital. Although
there is Supreme Court precedent for its constitutionality,"5 there
involving a felony or other major crime. In Giiffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (195b), the
Supreme Court insisted that the indigent defendant who so desired be furnished a copy of the
transcript to use in preparing his appeal.
63 As to review of sentence see Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 63, 64, 66, 10
U.S.C. §§ 863, 864, 866 (1964).
"See, e.g., United States v. Dunnahoe, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 745, 21 C.M.R. 67 (1956)
(character disorder may negate premeditation); United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346,
17 C.M.R. 346 (1954) (partial responsibility doctrine accepted in murder); United States v.
Burns, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 9 C.M.R. 30 (1953).
"395 U.S. at 264.
66 Article.36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964). There are a few instances, requirements of
corroboration and corpus delicti, for example, where the military practice seems to differ
from that in the federal district courts. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962); United States v., Villasenor, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 19 C.M.R. 129
(1955).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964), discussed in Everett, supra note 18. Although this Article does
purport to incoroorate many federal penal statutes into militarv law. there is some analogy
for doing so in the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), which is a "catch.
all" provision whereunder the criminal statutes of the surrounding state are incorporated
into the federal penal law applicable to a federal enclave. In United States v. Sharpnack,
355 U.S. 286 (1958), the constitutionality o f that legislation was upheld (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
"E.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). See Wiener, Are the General
Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague? 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968).
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has in recent years been a greater sensitivity to problems of
vagueness; and, as discussed elsewhere by the present writer, the
Armed Services have sometimes pushed Article 134 to the breaking
point. 9 Unfortunately this tendency is visible even in the most
recent versions of the Manual for Courts-Martial;70 and the results
may prove disastrous for military jurisdiction. However, the only
Article 134 offense charged against O'Callahan himself was assault
with intent to rape,71 which has long been recognized in military
law, was discussed'and specified at several points in the Manual for
Courts-Martial,72 and is familiar in civil courts. Thus, the issue of
vagueness should not have been a central one in determining if the
court-martial had jurisdiction to try O'Callahan.
Criticism of the majority opinion would be more muted if it
had given a clearer test for deciding when military jurisdiction
exists. Instead the Court ordains an inquiry as to which offenses
are "service-connected;" prior military precedents provide no
guidance in this regard.
In investigating the possible interpretations of "service-
connected," the Air Force searched electronically the data bases
used for its LITE (Legal Information Thru Electronics) system.7
3
" Everett, supra note 18.
70 The Court of Military Appeals has held, under the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES (1951), that solicitation of a crime is generally a simple "disorder"
punishable by no more than four months confinement. United States v. Wdlker, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 38, 23 C.M.R. 262 (1957); United States v. Oakley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23
C.M.R. 197 (1957). In the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1969), the
Table of Maximum Punishments provides specifically that: "Unless otherwise provided in
the Table, any person subject to the Code who is found guilty of soliciting or inducing
another person to commit an offense which, if committed by one subject to the Code, would
be punishable under this table, shall be subject to the maximum punishment authorized for
the offense solicited or induced, except that in no case shall. the death penalty be imposed nor
shall the period of confinement in any case, including offenses for which life imprisonment
may be adjudged, exceed 5 years." Id. at 127c, Table of Maximum Punishments, § A
n.7. Since Article 82 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 882 (1964),
prohibits solicitation to desert, mutiny, misbehave before the enemy, or engaging in sedition,
but does not proscribe other types of solicitation, the recent change in the punishment
authorized for solicitation to commit other offenses amounts to the use of Article 134 to
create, without legislative sanction, a new and serious class of crimes.
1' 395 U.S. at 260.
7 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 213d (1951) (specific discussion
of crime); id. at 127c, Table of Maximum Punishments, § A (punishment specified); id.
at Appendix 6c (sample specification).
" The Special Activities Group in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force operates LITE for the Department of Defense. Through LITE there can be obtained
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By means of this search there was located every use of the word
"service-connected" in the United States Code, in the 37
volumes of the Court-Martial Reports cdntaining the published
opinions of both the Court of Military Appeals and the Boards of
Review, in Air Force Regulations, and in the published and
unpublished opinions of the Comptroller General. This inclusive
search demonstrated that the word "service-connected" had never
been used by the Court of Military Appeals and had appeared in
only one Board of Review opinion. In that single instance, the
Board merely mentioned that the accused had suffered a "service-
connected" injury; the fact of service-connection was not material
to any issue in the case.74
The LITE search of the United States Code revealed that
Congress has chiefly been concerned with service-connection in the
context of retirement benefits and disability pay.75 The same holds
true as to the Air Force Regulations and the opinions of the
Comptroller General.
Interestingly, Congress has employed a very broad concept of
service-connection. Thus, in 38 U.S.C. section 101(16) the term is
defined to mean death or disability incurred or aggravated "in line
of duty in the active military, naval, or air service." In turn, "line
information as to the context in which a key-word appears each time it is used in materials
being searched. Through the KWIC (key word in context) method, information was obtained
as to the context in which the word "service-connected" was used, each time it appeared in
the Court-Martial Reports, the United States Code, Air Force Regulations and Comptroller
General Opinions. Further search made with other key words proved equally fruitless in
providing standards for determining which offenses are *service-connected" for purposes of
O"Callahan.
" United States v. Kelley, 22 C.M.R. 723, 724 (1d. of Review, 1956).
15 See 5 U.S.C. § 851 (1964) (entitlement to Federal employment preference); 5
U.S.C. § 2108 (1964) (veterans' preference in employment for disabled veterans); 5
U.S.C. § 2253 (1964) (creditable service for Federal employment); 5 U.S.C. § 3313 (1964)
(veterans' preference in Federal employment); 5 U.S.C. § 8332 (1964) (creditable service in
connection with Federal employment); 10 U.S.C. § 4342 (1964) (appointment of cadets); 10
U.S.C. § 6160 (1964) (pension to persons serving ten years); 10 U.S.C. § 6954 (1964)
(number of midshipmen); 10 U.S.C. § 9342 (1964) (appointment of cadets); 22
U.S.C. § 1092 (1964) (credits for prior service); 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 314, 351, 358, 360, 402,
410, 412, 512, 521, 523, 541-42, 601, 610, 612, 619, 624, 631-32, 634, 722, 725, 801, 902,
1501-03, 1652, 1701, 1712, 1765, 1801-03, 1818, 3012, 3503 (1964) (veterans' benefits); 42
U.S.C. § 428 (1964) (benefits at age 72 for certain uninsured individuals); 42
U.S.C. § 1581 (1964) (housing disposition preference); 42 U.S.C. § 1587 (1964) (preference
in disposition of certain housing): 42 U.S.C. § 1592a, 1592n (1964) (preference in




of duty," as dealt with in 38 U.S.C. section 105, applies "when the
person on whose account benefits are claimed was, at the time the
injury was suffered or disease contracted, in active military, naval,
or air service, whether on active duty or on authorized leave, unless
such injury or disease was the result of his own willful
misconduct. 76  Accordingly, for some purposes at least, the
serviceman is deemed to be "in line of duty"-and any resultant
injuries not due to his own misconduct are "service-
connected"-whether he is on leave, on "evening pass" as was
O'Callahan, or at his post. Admittedly this all-encompassing view
of service-connection is especially appropriate in furthering the
liberal policy which Congress and the armed services have adopted
in making benefits available for service personnel. It would 'be far
less appropriate if this view were used to limit the constitutional
rights of service personnel. However, the possible wide scope of the
service-connection concept reveals the difficulties that lie in its use
as the touchstone for determining military jurisdiction.
Service-connection has been utilized by the Supreme Court as a
criterion in deciding if military personnel can sue under the Federal
Tort Claims Act Distinguishing an earlier case where recovery
had been allowed to a serviceman who was then on furlough, the
Supreme Court ruled in Feres v. United States78 that military
personnel could not sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
"service-connected injuries or death due to negligence." But here
again the concept of service-connection was being used solely in
administering civil benefits; it had no relationship to military
jurisdiction in criminal matters. Also, this particular case hinged on
congressional intent. However, it appears that the Court's
interpretation of "service-connected" in Feres would be broader
than that of Justice Douglas in O'Callahan.79
Emphasis added.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
7 340 U.S. 135 (1950), distinguishing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
One point in the Court's reasoning in Feres might have relevance to O'Callahan. The
Court suggested that it would be ironic for the serviceman tort claimant, who has no choice
where he must serve, to have his rights against the Federal Government hinge-as is true
under the Federal Tort Claims Act-on the law of the state where the act or omission occurs
which gives rise to liability. See 340 U.S. at 142-43. The O'Callahan case has the practical
effect in some instances of subjecting the serviceman to the vagaries of the substantive and
procedural law of the state where he is stationed, rather than to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. While recent Supreme Court decisions incorporating specific safeguards of
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As noted earlier, Congress, in dealing with certain benefits for
"service-connected" death or disability, has equated "service-
.connected" to "in line of duty."8 "Line of duty" is also relevant
in imposing liability on the Government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which provides that a member of the armed services is
acting within the scope of his office or employment if he is "acting
* in line of duty."8 1 Although the problem is complicated by
reference to state law in determining scope of employment, 82 there
is no uniform pattern as to the circumstances which constitute
"line of duty." In some instances, members of the armed forces
have been held to be acting within the scope of their employment
and therefore to have generated liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act,'" even though they were on leave at the time of the
negligent act or omission, once again evidencing that service-
connection is an ambiguous term by which to delineate military
jurisdiction.
The majority opinion in O'Callahan does not make clear which
factors are sufficient to create service-connection of an offense, and
military jurisdiction over that offense. For instance, does it suffice
to show service-connection if the victim of an offense is in the
military? Or if the victim is a civilian dependent or employee? Must
either the accused or the victim be in uniform? What if the offense
occurred on a military reservation? Or in Government quarters? Is
the fourteenth amendment into the due process guarantee do provide a minimum standard
of procedural due process in the state courts, there remain ares of considerable difference.
Moreover, if O'Callahan applies overseas, the difference in procedural and substantive law
among different foreign courts would be greater than among the state courts in this country.
Thus, O'Callahan moves military personnel further away from the goal of being subject to
the application of uniform laws wherever they may be stationed-the goal of which the
Court spoke with favor in Feres. However, even before O'Callahan there existed a possibility
of considerable variety since local courts would generally have concurrent jurisdiction with
courts-martial over civil type offenses.
'o See text accompanying note 76 supra.
,28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1964).
See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
SSee, e.g., Bissell v. McElligott, 369 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 917
(1967); Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Mraz,,255
F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Kennedy, 230 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1956); Farmer
v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 750 (S.D. Iowa 1966); O'Brien v. United States, 236 F.
Supp. 792 (D. Me. 1964).
" See cases cited note 83 supra.
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the rank of the accused important? Is it significant whether military
property, or Government property generally, is involved? There
obviously will be considerable litigation in determining what are the
proper tests of "service-connection;" and the necessity for this
litigation would seem to be added reason for hesitancy in casting
aside the previously established, much simpler test of military
status.
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the majority opinion
in O'Callahan is that from the time of the framing of the question
on which certiorari was granted until the decision on June 2, 1969,
the Court assumed that the commission of serious felonies by a
serviceman would have no "military significance." The converse
seems more probable-that is, that the commission of any serious
crime by a serviceman does have military significance.
In one sense, this is illustrated by the case of General
Yamashita, whose Japanese armies occupied the Philippines during
World War II.1 Some of his soldiers looted, pillaged, and raped;
and, after Japan's surrender, Yamashita was tried by a military
tribunal for failure in his responsibilities as a commander by not
punishing those of his troops who had run amuck. In his defense
Yamashita claimed that for various reasons he had lacked the
power to control his men and that he should not be punished
for occurrences which he could not prevent8 6 This contention was
decided against him and ultimately he was executed. Although the
case involves the law of war rather than American constitutional
law, it seems to establish that a commander will be held responsible
for maintaining discipline among his troops and preventing them
from committing crimes against the populace. This responsibility
may be difficult for a commander to fulfill if serious felonies must
be dealt with through civil courts instead of by military tribunals.
To put it differently, civil crimes do have "military significance"
so long as the courts and the public are disposed to hold a
commander responsible for failure to curtail those crimes.
Another type of "military significance" derives from the often-
observed habit of grouping persons in terms of some general
characteristic. Although there is vocal distrust for guilt by
association, it is not unusual for the inference to be drawn that
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
For an interesting account, see A. REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949).
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"birds of a feather flock together." An obvious basis for grouping
persons together as the object of certain attitudes is that they are
all members of the armed services. Thus, a publicized crime
committed by one soldier may affect the reputation of every other
serviceman in the same community:
In effect, each serviceman holds the key to the reputation of his
comrades-in-arms, and is under an obligation to them not to do things that
will discredit them. Military justice seeks to enforce this obligation and to
provide a pressure for each serviceman to abide by standards that will not
lower the Armed Services and their personnel in the public eye. If those
standards are not maintained, it makes life less tolerable for the man in
uniform, frustrates recruitment of new servicemen, and diminishes the
cooperation of the general public with the Armed Forces8
Many civil type offenses have been tried as conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman. 8 This concern with the honor of
officers may proceed from a premise that it is especially important
for the reputation of the military establishment that its officers be
considered as honorable men. However, can it be asserted that
today there is any less "military significance" in assuring that both
officers and enlisted personnel have the confidence and respect of
the populace?
In instances where a member of the armed services is awaiting
trial by civil court, he is often rendered useless for military duties.
There may be considerable reluctance to reassign him because of
the foreseeable need subsequently to return him for trial and for
possible imprisonment. If an accused serviceman is sentenced to
confinement, he obviously is much more suitable for rehabilitation
and for further service in the armed forces if he can be retrained
during that confinement.89 Thus, an offense may have "military
significance" because of the relationship between the trial and
punishment alternatives for that offense and the feasibility of
obtaining further military service from the accused serviceman.
THE AFTERMATH TO O'CALLAHAN
After the Supreme Court's decision the Government considered
seeking a rehearing, by which, as in the Reid v. Covert"0 litigation,
R. EVERErT. supra note 24, at 3.
"See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
The Air Force, for example, pioneered in rehabilitation with its Retraining Group at
Amarillo Air Force Base-later moved to Lowry Air Force Base. This minimum custody
facility was quite successful in retraining airmen for return to duty.
"354 U.S. 1 (1957), withdrawing 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
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a losing party might snatch victory from defeat." However,
Supreme Court Rule 58 provides that a petition for rehearing may
be granted only at the instance of a justice who concurred in the
judgment or decision and with the concurrence of a majority of the
Court. Moreover, only twenty-five days are allowed for the
submission of such a petition.12 The primary problem was to find a
Justice who had belonged to the majority in O'Calahan and who
would vote for a rehearing, as Justice Harlan had done in the Reid
v. Covert litigation. Apparently this hurdle was insuperable, 3 and
no petition for rehearing was filed.
Meanwhile all the armed services decided to take a very
restrictive view of O'Callahan, just as they had taken a narrow
view of Reid v. Covert a decade before. 4 The Boards of
Review-reconstituted on August 1, 1969, as Courts of Military
Review-followed suit. It was held that O'Callahan had no
extraterritorial effect and therefore did not apply to a court-martial
1' Initially the Supreme Court upheld military jurisdiction over civilian dependents in an
opinion announced by Mr. Justice Clark for the Supreme Court on June II, 1956. Kinsella
v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956). Thereafter, a petition for rehearing was submitted, and
Justice Harlan, who had concurred in the original opinion, decided to vote for the rehearing,
which was granted on November 5, 1956. 352 U.S. 901-02 (1956). Justice Brennan, then
serving on an interim appointment as a replacement to Justice Minton, who had retired on
October 15, 1956, took no part in consideration of the petition for rehearing, and Justices
Reed, Burton, and Clark indicated that they would deny the petition. Finally, on June 10,
1957, the Supreme Court published its final opinion on the subject in Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. I (1957), and withdrew its earlier opinion, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). At that time, Justice
Black wrote the plurality opinion, wherein Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and
Douglas concurred. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result, on the ground
that military jurisdiction over such civilians did not exist in capital cases. Justice Whittaker,
who replaced Justice Reed on the Court on March 25, 1957, did not participate in the
decision; and Justices Clark and Burton were the sole dissenters. See Everett, supra note 35.
9 SUP. CT. R. 58, 388 U.S. 987-88 (1967).
In a report to the Judge Advocates Association in Dallas, Texas, on August 11, 1969,
Major General Kenneth Hodson, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, stated that he
and the Solicitor General did not believe that any member of the original majority would be
willing to join in the petition for rehearing. Also, it was anticipated that other cases
concerning military jurisdiction would soon reach the Court and that the overruling of
O 'Callahan could then be urged before the Court as reconstituted.
11 At that time the different Services had construed Reid v. Covert to mean only that
civilian dependents could not be tried in peacetime for capital offenses committed overseas,
but that military jurisdiction existed as to non-capital offenses. After O'Callahan the
position was taken that the presence of almost any element lacking in O'Callahan would be
sufficient to sustain military jurisdiction and that O'Callahan is neither retroactive nor
extraterritorial in effect. See, e.g., Army Judge Advocate General, Directive JAJG
1969/8399(June 4, 1969), noted in 5 CRi. L. REv. 2229 (1969) (narrow construction of
the case ordered by Judge Advocate General of the Army).
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for a robbery committed in Germany!' The decision was held to be
prospective and to apply only to trials commenced after June 2,
1969.96 A Board of Review concluded that the Supreme Court had
been "speaking only in terms of placing a limitation on the exercise
of jurisdiction-not in terms of its existence or nonexistence" and
that "the limitation imposed by O'Callahan is, in our view,
functional rather than jurisdictional.""' In an assault case, where
one airman injured another while both were off-base, the Board of
Review upheld jurisdiction of the court-martial and pointed out
that both the accused and the victim
[w]ere active duty members of the United States Air Force and such
conduct on their part would certainly tend to bring discredit upon the Air
Force in the eyes of the citizens of Las Vegas. Conduct of this nature is also
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces. Additionally,
the Air Force was deprived of the services of the victim during the period of
time that he was hospitalized and unable to report for duty. .. P
In another case, bigamy was deemed, to be service-connected,
the Board noting that:
It is common knowledge that dependents of the service member become
entitled under current statutes, implemented by directives of the respective
services, to many substantial rights and benefits. The bona fide dependents
are entitled to allotments, medical care, commissary and exchange
privileges, to name but a few.
It takes but little perspicacity to understand the plethora of ways in
which the services are involved when one of its members acquires an illegal
second set of dependents.
...The facts of the instant case most eloquently illustrate that the
ceremony was but the springboard from which the appellant proceeded to
illegally extract from the Government monies and benefits to which his
bigamous partner was not entitled, while living in this illegal status. We
have no difficulty in perceiving that such a bigamous relationship,
particularly within the circumstances of this case involves a flouting of
military authority and directly facilitated the obtaining of the above-
mentioned unauthorized money, services, and other military benefits.
Furthermore, it is clear that this offense is prejudicial to good order and
discipline in or brings discredit upon the armed forces . . .
" United States v. Gill, ACM 20452 (Bd. of Review, July 31, 1969).
so United States v. King, ACM 20361 (Bd. of Review, July 30, 1969), contains an
interesting review of Supreme Court precedents on prospective application of certain rccent
decisions.
97 Id.
"United States v. Everson, ACM S-22769 (Bd. of Review, June 25, 1969).
"United States v. Burkhart, ACM S-22793 (Bd. of Review, June 27, 1969).
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A forgery could be tried by court-martial, because the offense
occurred in a barracks and a fellow soldier was the victim.
00
Utterance of a disloyal statement off-post in the continental United
States is military-connected and so falls within court-martial
jurisdiction. 0' Wrongful possession of marijuana close to midnight
and some ten miles from the accused's duty station had military
significance and could be punished by court-martial, the Board of
Review remarking that "[t]he 'victim' or 'victims' of the alleged
offense may legitimately be regarded as military, i.e.: either
[accused] himself, or more directly, the United States Army or a
portion thereof."1'0 There have also been suggestions that offenses
occurring at the present time do not fall within the O'Callahan
rationale since they are not peacetime offenses.
0 3
The Court of Military Appeals has proved less grudging in its
application of O'Callahan v. Parker. On September 5, 1969 it held
in United States v. Borys'014 that the accused officer could not be
tried by a general court-martial convened in Georgia for offenses
which occurred off-post in the homes of the victims, located in
Georgia and South Carolina. The crimes took place
during accused's off-duty hours or when he was on leave, involved purely
civilian female victims, and constituted rape, robbery, sodomy, and attempts
to commit such acts, all such crimes being civil in nature. The accused was
described as wearing civilian clothing, and the vehicle which he used-and
which eventually led to his apprehension-was his own private automobile.
The sole mention of any military matter in the case was a bumper sticker




Captain Borys had initially been arrested by civil authorities, tried
and acquitted in a South Carolina state court as to some of his
crimes, and then brought before a general court-martial. At the
time of the decision in O'Callahan, the Borys case had been
pending before the Court of Military Appeals on the issue of
double jeopardy resulting from the state court acquittal. The
opinion of the court made this comparison of the accused's
offenses with those involved in O'Callahan:
They, too, involved civilian victims, unconnected with the military.
'® United States v. Taylor, CM 420339 (Bd. of Review, June 17, 1969).
:o United States v. Bell, CM 419988 (Bd. of Review, July 3, 1969).
'n United States v. Konieczko, CM 419706 (Bd. of Review, June 19, 1969).
"1 Id. (Nemrow, J., concurring).
"I United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969).
10 Id. at 547-48,40 C.M.R. at 257-58.
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Neither Georgia nor South Carolina were armed camps on far-flung outposts
under Army control. Accused's horrible acts, like those of O'Callahan, did
not flout military authority, breach military security, or affect military
property. In fact, he himself did not even reside on post, but lived among
the civilian community on which he preyed. Finally, the courts of South
Carolina and Georgia were not only open and functioning, but resort to the
former's facilities led only to accused's acquittal.
In sum, accused's military status was only a happenstance of chosen
livelihood, having nothing to do with his vicious and depraved conduct, and
none of his acts were 'service connected' under any test or standard set out
by the Supreme Court. In short, they, like O'Callahan's, were the very sort
remanded to the appropriate civil jurisdiction in which indictment by grand
jury and trial by petit jury could be afforded the defendant.,"
This opinion, written by Judge Ferguson, rejected the dissent's
argument that, in addition to service-connection, the offense must
be triable in a federal court in order to escape the application of
O'Callahan. Significantly the opinion does not suggest that the
conviction of Captain Borys might be sustained because his trial
had taken place prior to the O'Callahan decision or because it was
not a "peacetime" offense.
Chief Judge Quinn's dissent noted that the Court of Military
Appeals is bound by decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting
the Constitution; but it expressed "hope that the searching criticism
of the bench and bar may, as it has on other occasions, convince a
new or future majority of the Supreme Court of the error of
O'Callahan."'' 7 The Chief Judge reasoned that two factors must
coexist in order to preclude military jurisdiction over an offense: (1)
that it is "cognizable in a civilian court," and (2) that it is "not
service-connected" or has "no military significance." As to the
first factor, he added that the "civilian court" must be established
under federal authority; thereby he distinguished O'Callahan, since
the offenses committed by Sergeant O'Callahan could have been
tried in a court of the then-Territory of Hawaii and any such court
derived its power from the Federal Government.
In United States v. Prather,' decided by the Court of Military
Appeals at the same time as Borys, a general court-martial was
held to lack jurisdiction under the O'Callahan rule. The offenses
involved were wrongful appropriation of an automobile, robbing a
16 d. at 549,40 C.M.R. at 259.
M7 Id. at 550,40 C.M.R. at 260.
1" 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560,40 C.M.R. 272 (1969).
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gasoline station, and resisting arrest. The important facts were
these:
On the morning of August 10, 1967, the accused appropriated a 1964
civilian-owned Volkswagen sedan parked behind an office building in
Marietta, Georgia. After purchasing a .22 caliber revolver and box of
cartridges, he held up the attendant of a service station in Mableton,
Georgia, obtaining $148.00. Later, while driving the misappropriated
vehicle, he exchanged gunshots with pursuing police. Eventually Prather
drove into a block wall, escaped from the car, and ran to the home of his
parents where he hid in the basement. There he was taken into police
custody.'
Chief Judge Quinn again dissented, adding here the argument that
under the circumstances-including an informal commitment from
civil authorities that they would not prosecute if the military
"punished" him-Prather had waived the constitutional rights he
would have had if tried in a state court and had validly consented
to trial by court-martial.
A week after its decisions in Borys and Prather, the Court of
Military Appeals considered the applicability of the O'Callahan
decision to marijuana offenses. The accused in United States v.
Beeker 0 had been found guilty of five marijuana offenses: (I) unlaw-
ful importation of marijuana into the United States contrary to 21
U.S.C. § 176a; (2) unlawful transportation of marijuana contrary to
21 U.S.C. § 176a; (3) wrongful possession on a military installation;
(4) wrongful use off-post; and (5) wrongful use of marijuana on a
military installation. Noting that a federal civilian court has
cognizance of the first two offenses alleged, the court ruled that they
entailed "the exercise of governmental powers different from regu-
lation of the armed forces" and were not triable by court-martial.
However, use or possession of marijuana and narcotics, whether
on or off-post, "has singular military significance which carries
the act outside the limitation on military jurisdiction set out in the
O'Callahan case." '
11 Id. at 561, 40 C.M.R. at 273.
tt 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563,40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
Id. at 565, 40 C.M.R. at 277. A federal district court has subsequently accepted the
position that use of marijuana by a serviceman, either on or off post, might have military
significance, but it would not accept this view as to off base possession of marijuana. Moylan
v. Laird, C.A. File No. 4179 (D.R.I., Oct. 20, 1969). The Court of Military Appeals has held
that unlawful delivery of drugs to another serviceman, whether on or off post, is service-
connected. United States v. Rose, No. 21,715 (C.M.A.. Oct. 3, 1969).
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Two weeks later, the court held that a general court-martial
lacked jurisdiction to try the accused for carnal knowledge of a
female under the age of sixteen. 2 The victim was a military de-
pendent whom the accused had met at an Air Force Base, but the
offense occurred at his off-base apartment. Noting that only the
status of the victim as a military dependent and the fact that he
met her on-base differentiated the case from O'Callahan the court
conceded that "these factors might, in a proper case, provide the
necessary 'service connection' to invest a court-martial with juris-
diction over a particular offense," but it did "not believe they
are controlling here." The court added:
It was not essential to their initial meeting that the victim shall have been
a military dependent for, in the main, military posts are open to the public.
We know of no reason to believe that the rules at Ramey Air Force Base
are to the contrary. In addition, her service connection was natal and not
legal and, as such, insufficient to bring her personally within the ambit of
the Uniform Code. Reid v. Covert [354 U.S. 1 (1957)]. In her testimony at
trial, the victim did not indicate that her activities with the accused were in
any manner premised on his status as a serviceman." 3
In another case of carnal knowledge a distinction was drawn by
the court as to the place where the offense had occurred."' There
the accused had engaged in sexual intercourse in on-base housing,
and in view of the need to maintain "the security of a military
post," the court-martial was held to possess jurisdiction.
Three specifications of passing worthless checks with intent to
defraud, in violation of Article 123a of the Code, were before the
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Williams."' Two of
the checks had been cashed at the Consolidated Exchange located
on base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The court reasoned that
[i]nasmuch as the uttering of these particular checks took place on base, and
cashed at the Fort Bragg Consolidated Exchange, a governmental agency on
the base, we believe that the offenses were 'service connected' within the
meaning of O'Callahan v. Parker, supra, and that the court-martial had
jurisdiction to try the accused."'
"I United States v. Henderson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969). The offense
was charged under Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920
(1964).
"I Id. at 602, 40 C.M.R. at 314.
" United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609,40 C.M.R. 321 (1969).
It 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605,40 C.M.R. 317 (1969).
"I Id. at 606,40 C.M.R. at 318.
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However, the third check had been written to satisfy a grocery
account. In that instance the offense
took place in the civilian community and a civilian was victimized
thereby. The offense was triable in the courts of North Carolina. Under the
rationale of O'Callahan v. Parker, supra, this offense was. not 'service
connected' and, hence, the court-martial was without jurisdiction to
proceed. '7
In United States v. Crapol" the Court of Military Appeals
reviewed findings that the accused had been guilty of attempted
robbery and robbery. The former had taken place in Seattle,
Washington, and there was
no evidence in this record that the offense had any military significance
other than the status of the accused as a member of the armed forces of the
United States. Since the courts of the State of Washington have cognizance
of this offense, it is apparent that the court-martial was without jurisdiction
to proceed thereon."9
The robbery, however, had been initiated when the accused and
a companion assaulted a cab driver on a military reservation.
Although the taking of the victim's money occurred three blocks
outside the gate to the reservation,
the fact that the assault and force and violence, elements of the
robbery, took place within the confines of a military reservation is, in our
opinion, a sufficient basis to sustain military jurisdiction over the offense,
O'Callahan v. Parker, supra. The security of the base demands it.120
In another case, which involved a conviction for theft of an
automobile, the car had been stolen from a car lot in Oceanside,
California, and subsequently brought onto a military post. The
Court of Military Appeals, although adverting to the contention
that bringing of the vehicle on base compromised "the security of a
military post," replied:
When the automobile was taken from the used car lot, the crime of
larceny was complete and jurisdiction was thereupon vested in the local
courts. There is simply no evidence that the larceny was 'service connected'
as the subsequent use of the vehicle was irrelevant to the proof of the
charged offense. We take no view on whether the bringing of stolen property
upon a military base is an offense triable by court-martial. That
determination will have to be left for resolution in a proper case. We do
"' Id.; accord, United States v. Cochran, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 588,40 C.M.R. 300 (1969).
us 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594,40 C.M.R. 306 (1969).
I d. at 595,40 C.M.R. at 306.
12 Id. at 596, 40 C.M.R. at 308.
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hold that under the circumstances of this case, it is insufficient to vest this
special court-martial with jurisdiction .1
2
In United States v. Shockley,22 which involved a conviction of
sodomy, the Court of Military Appeals ruled that military
jurisdiction had been lacking as to the offenses which took place in
the accused's off-base residence at Oceanview, Virginia. The court
went on to say:
A different conclusion, however, is dictated with reference to the
commission of the offense of sodomy at Camp Allen. Camp Allen is a
Government housing area located within the confines of the Naval Base at
Norfolk, Virginia. As such, the military are charged with maintaining the
security of that area. This factor is sufficient to vest in the court-martial
jurisdiction to try this portion of the offense.'13
In a case involving wrongful appropriation of a truck owned by
a civilian, the Court of Military Appeals ruled that military
jurisdiction existed since the offense occurred on the Presidio of
San Francisco, a military reservation. In the court's view, the
crime directly affected "the security of a military post.'12 4
Espionage by an Army sergeant was the subject of United
States v. J-laris. 25 In upholding military jurisdiction, the Court of
Military Appeals emphasized that
the documents involved were inner-working papers of the military
establishment and, while not containing a security classification, one was
marked for official use only. They were not generally available to the
civilian populace. The security and integrity of these documents rests
exclusively within the military establishment.'
Furthermore, the accused's military duties played a major role in
his participation in the conspiracy.
United States v. Castro 1 7 concerned a conviction for violating a
general regulation by unlawful possession of barbiturates and for
"I United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 604,40 C.M.R. 315, 316 (1969).
1- 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969). See also Fleiner v. Koch, Misc. No. 69-47
(C.M.A., writ of prohibition granted Oct. 7, 1969). It is interesting to contrast the result in
these cases with that reached in the Augenblick litigation, notes 33-34 supra and accompanying
text.
2'Id. at 611,40 C.M.R. 323.
" United States v. Paxiao, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 608,609,40 C.M.R. 320, 321 (1969).
" 18 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 40 C.M.R. 308 (1969). See also United States v. Safford, No.
21,929 (C.M.A., Oct. 17, 1969).
"I Id. at 597,40 C.M.R. at 309.
12 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598,40 C.M.R. 310 (1969).
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carrying a concealed weapon. As to the former charge, the Court
of Military Appeals remarked:
In our opinion, the existence of a general regulation declaring specified
conduct as punishable, does not, standing alone, per se confer jurisdiction on
a court-martial to try one accused of its violation. The coqduct proscribed
therein must be 'service connected' within the meaning of O'Callahan v
Parker, supra. The reason is obvious, for to hold otherwise would be
tantamount to giving to the military authority to regulate and punish
conduct of servicemen in excess of that granted to Congress under Article 1,
section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution to 'make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.' Congressional power to
regulate in this area is limited to those matters which are 'service
connected." 8
Nonetheless, the court upheld the conviction for violating the
regulation, since unlawful use and possession of the prohibited
drugs is detrimental to the health, morale, and fitness for duty of
persons in the armed forces.' As to carrying the concealed
weapon, the court considered that such misconduct could be
punished by court-martial if it occurred within the confines of a
military establishment. Since such a fact had not been proved, no
court-martial was entitled to try the case.
Over the dissent of Judge Ferguson, the Court of Military
Appeals ruled that theft or robbery from another serviceman is
service-connected,13 and that breaking into the off-base residence of
a fellow serviceman in Midwest City, Oklahoma was subject to mili-
tary jurisdiction. 3 1 With Cliief Judge Quinn dissenting, the court
held that military jurisdiction was lacking to prosecute the theft of
an automobile belonging to a retired major, even though the accused
was wearing military fatigues.12 However, where an accused who was
wearing fatigues had used his military standing to facilitate his mis-
appropriation of a car from a used-car salesman, a majority of the
court upheld jurisdiction . 3 Similarly, the uttering of forged checks
by the accused was considered to be service-connected where each
,I ld. at 600,40 C.M.R. at 312.
IZd. See also United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969);
United States v. Rose, No. 21,715 (C.M.A., Oct. 3, 1969).
' United States v. Plamondon, No. 21,569 (C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969).
' United States v. Rego, No. 21,661 (C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969); accord, United States v.
Camancho, No. 21,659 (C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969).
' United States v. Armes, No. 22,184 (C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969).
' United States v. Peak, No. 21,880 (C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969).
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check was successfully cashed because the victims "were made
aware of and placed reliance on his military status."
134
In reviewing an appeal from conviction for misconduct involving
marijuana, the Court of Military Appeals unanimously concluded
that, since the offenses occurred in Germany, "the constitutional
limitation on court-martial jurisdiction delineated in the O'Callahan
case is inapplicable.' '"3 No attempt was made to justify in detail
this important holding.
In none of these cases has the Court of Military Appeals dealt
expressly with the issue of retroactivity. At least to some extent,
O'Callahan has already been applied retroactively by the court. The
court's decisions concerning the scope of the service-connection con-
cept have been rendered in cases that were tried before the Supreme
Court's opinion in O'Callahan.'31 The court has not suggested that
O'Callahan is inapplicable, during the present period of active hos-
tilities abroad.
The presence of frequent dissents in the cases determining
which offenses are service-connected helps demonstrate that this test
is sometimes difficult to apply. In turn, the difficulty of application
suggests that a different test of military jurisdiction should be
utilized.
Of special import is the restriction which the Court of Military
Appeals imposes upon the military's power to regulate conduct of
military personnel which is not "service-connected." Absent this
restriction, military authorities might establish military jurisdiction
over otherwise non-service-connected conduct by promulgating
orders that military personnel not engage in such conduct.
Some of the opinions seem to place emphasis on whether an
American civil court might try the offense charged. There are some
pitfalls in this approach since it tends to make military jurisdiction
dependent on the vagaries of state and federal regulation. Thus,
military jurisdiction over a citizen might be expanded by limiting
the jurisdiction of state and federal civil courts to try that type of
offense when committed by a serviceman.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
' United States v. Hallahan, No. 22,229 (C.M.A.. Oct. 24. 1969): accord, United
States v. Morisseau, No. 22,250 (C.M.A.. Oct. 10, 1969).
'1 United States v. Weinstein, No. 21,909 (C.M.A.. Oct. 17, 1969).
"I See Court of Military Appeals decisions cited notes 104-21, 123-35 supra.
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given a broad interpretation to O'Callahan. In Latney v. Ignatius37
the issue was the jurisdiction of a Navy general court-martial to
try for murder an American merchant seaman accused of fatally
stabbing another seaman at a bar in DaNang, South Viet-Nam.
Both men had been serving on an oil tanker then under charter to
the Navy and had been engaged in off-loading oil, gasoline, and
aviation fuel. The court of appeals quoted a passage from Justice
Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan wherein he had commented that
earlier cases "decide that courts-martial have no jurisdiction to try
those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no matter how
intimate the connection between their offense and the concerns of
military discipline .. .""s Conceding that the O'Callahan opinion
had concerned peacetime offenses committed within American
territorial limits, the court's per curiam opinion nonetheless con-
cluded that
the spirit of O'Callahan, and of the other Supreme Court precedents there
reviewed, precludes an expansive view of Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(10), even assuming as we do that this
is a time of undeclared war which permits some invocation of the war power
under which Article 2(10) was enacted.'3'
Although the case involved only the question of military
jurisdiction over a civilian in South Viet-Nam, the court's opinion
does not seem conducive to arguments that O'Callahan applies
only within the United States and in time of complete peace.
The decision in O'Callahan has been utilized in some efforts to
enjoin trial by court-martial. Also, it has been relied on in petitions
for certiorari; 40 and probably the Government will in some
instances join in requesting that the Supreme Court grant certiorari
in order to define more clearly the full scope of O'Callahan. Thus,
as an aftermath to O'Callahan, the federal courts at every level are
being called upon to answer questions to which it gives rise.
,3- No. 21,681 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1969).
' Id.
i~' Id.
"'See, e.g., United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969), petition Jbr cert. filed. 38
U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1969) (No. 551); Swift v. Commandant, petition for cert. filed.
(June 4, 1969) (No. 391); Relford v. Commandant. petition Jor cert. filed, (July 22, 1969)
(No. 665).
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SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
Retroactivity
In recent years the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine
that, in some instances, its precedents should only be applied
prospectively and should not affect criminal cases that have been
completed. The exclusionary rule as to search and seizure was
applied only to state court cases in which direct appeal had not
been concluded before the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio."' A
similar position was taken as to the prohibition of comment on a
defendant's silence at his trial42 but not as to the requirement that
counsel be furnished to indigent defendants in state trials involving
serious offenses. 43 In Johnson v. New Jersey"4 it was held that the
Escobedo"5 and Miranda"6 decisions applied only to cases tried
after the dates on which these two cases were decided. However, the
Miranda rule was not extended to a case that was originally tried
prior to the decision in Miranda, but was reversed and then retried
after Miranda.41 In Stovall v. Denno"48 the Supreme Court held
that the rule concerning the right to counsel at police lineups
should only be applied to lineups that were subsequent to the date
of the decision in Wade.4
9
"' 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp was held inapplicable to state convictions which had already
become final. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
I Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which prohibited comment upon the
defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial, was held applicable only to cases that
had not become final before that decision was handed down. Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
" Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). (applied right to counsel to revocation of
probation and imposition of deferred sentencing); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(extended right to counsel to the appellate processY- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (established the right to counsel in a criminal trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961) (affirmed right to counsel at certain arraignments). In each instance, the right to
counsel was applied retroactively. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3 (1968).
1 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11 Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969).
"- 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall was singularly unfortunate. His was one of three lineup
cases pending before the Supreme Court. The defendants in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967) and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) appealed successfully on this
issue. As to Stovall, on the other hand, the requirement of counsel at a lineup was applied
prospectively.
"I United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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In attempting to explain its techniques for prospective
overruling of prior decisions, the Supreme Court has called
attention to these factors:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards.'3'
Especially significant is this justification advanced by Chief Justice
Warren for the Court in Jenkins v. Delaware concerning
the problem inherent in prospective decision-making, i.e., some defendants
benefit from the new rule while others do not, solely because of the fortuities
that determine the progress of their cases from initial investigation and arrest to
final judgment. The resulting incongruities must be balanced against the
impetus the technique provides for the implementation of long overdue reforms,
which otherwise could not be practicably effected. 15'
Against this backdrop, what position will ultimately be taken by
the Supreme Court as to the retroactivity of O'Callahan v. Parker?
Certainly there has been protracted reliance on precedents and
statutes which upheld military jurisdiction over offenses by
servicemen that-under one interpretation-were not "service-
connected." This reliance was one reason for the shock within the
military establishment when O'Callahan was decided.
Most important, the practical consequences of retroactivity for
O'Callahan are startling to contemplate. To some extent, these
consequences are magnified by recent Supreme Court decisions
allowing a conviction to be challenged even though the confinement
imposed thereunder has been completely served. 12 Thus, convictions
by court-martial-especially if accompanied by the stigma of a
dishonorable or bad conduct discharge-might be challenged long
after any confinement resulting therefrom had been served.
Furthermore, conviction by court-martial often results in forfeiture
of pay and allowances; 3 and suits to recover this back pay are a
' Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); see Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969) (giving a fully prospective application to the limitations on electronic surveillance
established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
" Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969).
"'See, e.g.. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968).
'1 Concerning the power 6f courts-martial to subject a serviceman to forfeiture of pay and




familiar means of challenging the jurisdiction of the court-
martial. 54 Thus, subject to any statute of limitations applicable to
such suits for back pay, persons who had been convicted by court-
martial of offenses that were not service-connected might sue the
United States for back pay.
Defense against collateral attack on court-martial convictions
would be difficult because at the original trial, under the law as it
was then understood, the Government had no occasion to offer
evidence whether the offenses were service-connected. Thus, as to
many offenses that, in fact, were service-connected, it might
be especially difficult for the Government to establish military juris-
diction at thiklate date.
Military jutice has always relied on the unitary sentence' 5-a
single sentence for all the charges whereof the accused has been
found guilty-rather than having a separate sentence imposed as to
each charge. Thus, if an accused had been convicted by court-
martial of a service-connected offense and also of an offense that
was not service-connected, it may now be necessary to impose an
entirely new sentence based solely on the offense as to which the
court-martial had possessed jurisdiction.
Where in sentencing an accused a court-martial had considered
a prior court-martial conviction' of an offense that was not service-
connected, the accused would seem entitled to relief under a
retroactive application of O'Callahan. Similarly, where a military
administrative discharge had been predicated in part on court-
martial conviction of an offense as to which jurisdiction had been
lacking, the former serviceman might seek to invalidate the
conviction.'57
A recent decision concerning the right to a jury trial in a state
court' 5 was given only prospective application by the Supreme
" See. e.g., United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907); Swaim v. United States, 165
U.S. 553 (1897); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887); Keyes v. United States, 109
U.S. 336 (1883); Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
See, e.g.. Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 574, 578-79 (1957).
After a finding or guilt but prior to sentencing the court-martial is presented evidence as
to previous convictions. In some instances, the prior convictions will authorize increased
punishment. See MANUAL. FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 127c, § B (1969).
1- As to the grounds for military administrative discharges and the methods of attack on
such discharges, see Everett, MilitarY .Idministrative Discharges-The Pendthnt Swings,
1966 DUKE L.J. 41.
151 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Court."'59 Thus, since O'Callahan was concerned principally with the
serviceman's right to grand jury indictment and to trial by jury, it
might follow that O'Callahan should be given only pgrospective
application. And this argument, together with important practical
considerations, may prove decisive.
However, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to apply
retroactively a decision which dealt with the fairness of the fact-
finding process. 160 In view of Justice Douglas' condemnation of
military justice in O'Callahan, it would follow that the integrity of
the fact-finding process was at stake if a court-martial conviction
for a non-service-connected offense were allowed to stand.
Moreover, in view of the traditional reluctance to hold that
jurisdiction of person or subject matter can be conferred even by
consent, 6 ' there may well be judicial hesitancy to uphold a
conviction of an offense as to which it now appears jurisdiction was
lacking.
Hopefully, when the question of retroactivity is considered by
the Supreme Court, that body will be better prepared than on June
2, 1969 to compare the fairness of military trial with that available
in civil courts. If so, the Court may conclude that servicemen tried
by court-martial for offenses lacking military significance were not
placed at a disadvantage in relation to the fairness of the trials they
might have received if tried in a civil tribunal. Then, with an eye to
the dire practical consequences that would accompany a retroactive
application of O'Callahan, the Court should hold that the decision
would apply only to cases tried after June 2, 1969-or perhaps only
to cases as to which appellate review had not been completed prior
to that date. Since a majority of the Court, as now reconstituted,
may be unhappy with the O'Callahan decision, it is all the more
likely that, if not squarely overruled, the case will be limited by any
available means, such as by applying it prospectively only.
"I DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
I10 See, e.g., Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S.
2 (1968); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). In the Roberts case the Court emphasized:
"And even if the impact of retroactivity may be significant, the constitutional error presents
a serious risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined."
392 U.S. at 295.
M See Everett, supra note 35, at 408.
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Extraterritoriality
Another convenient technique for limiting O'Callahan-and one
which has already been utilized' 2-is to hold that it applies only to
the United States and has no extraterritorial effect. Such a holding
is supported by strong practical considerations. In the first place,
to hold otherwise would not further the goal of providing
additional safeguards of fair trial for servicemen. Currently the
United States is a party to various treaties and agreements dealing
with criminal jurisdiction over American forces stationed in foreign
countries. Most of these follow the pattern of the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement'63 in providing that the host country has primary
jurisdiction over most civil-type offenses committed within its
territory by American servicemen. Thus, crimes which most clearly
are not "service-connected" within the meaning of O'Callahan
would also generally fall within the primary jurisdiction of the host
country, if committed overseas. However, in a high percentage of
cases the host country waives its primary jurisdiction, and the
accused serviceman is tried by American court-martial.'64
If the American court-martial lacks jurisdiction to try the
serviceman, obviously there would be no basis for requesting a
waiver of the host country's primary jurisdiction, and few waivers
would be granted. If tried at all, the American serviceman would be
tried in such instances by a foreign tribunal which usually would
not provide him the rights to grand jury indictment and trial by
petit jury that O'Callahan purports to protect.
The jurisdiction of American civil courts could not feasibly be
expanded to fill the jurisdictional void that would be created by
extraterritorial application of O'Callahan. First, it would be
impractical for American civil courts, sitting in the United States,
to obtain testimony about crimes that occurred several thousand
miles away. There would be no procedure to compel the attendance
of foreign nationals as witnesses; and the trier of fact would be
totally unfamiliar with the scene of the crime. Secondly, the host
countries where the crimes had been committed might resent the
"See United States v. Weinstein. No. 21,909 (C.M.A.. Oct. 10. 1969); United States v.
Gill, ACM 20452 (Bd. of Review, July 30, 1969).
1 June 19, 1951, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, art. VII.
"' See R. EVERETT. supra note 24, at 44-45. In some instances, the serviceman might
prefer trial in a foreign court, since such courts have generally been rather lenient. Id. at 43.
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implicit disparagement of their ability to try fairly civil-type crimes
committed within their own boundaries."5 Finally, there might be
serious constitutional questions about the basis for creating
jurisdiction in American civil courts to try offenses committed
overseas that were not "service-connected" and therefore could not
be tried by court-martial.
A similar argument has been presented by the author in
criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling that courts-martial could
not be empowered-at least, in time of peace-to try offenses
committed overseas by civilian employees and dependents.16  There,
however, the number of persons affected was far less,' and it was
difficult to include civilians of any type within the phrase "land and
naval Forces" for purposes of invoking Congressional power under
article one, section eight, clause fourteen.
A difficulty of logic exists in concluding that an offense that
would not be "service-connected" or have "military significance"
if committed within the United States acquires these attributes
when committed overseas. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court which,
in dealing with retroactivity, has displayed its great concern for
practical considerations 68 and which may now be unsympathetic
with O'Callahan, might accept the argument that O'Callahan is
not to be applied extraterritorially.
Wartime Ojfenses
The principal opinion in O'Callahan carefully notes: "Finally,
we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from
the war power."'6 9 Obviously the war power is a broad one,7 ' but
it is not all-encompassing. Furthermore, what level of hostilities
would suffice for purposes of distinguishing O'Callahan?
'1 In some countries where American troops have been stationed, there has been
resentment of treaty provisions which tended to insulate servicemen from trial in the local
civil courts. In Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), contention between the United States
and Japan as to who should try a serviceman accused of homicide was finally resolved by an
American waiver of its claim of primary jurisdiction.
'c' See Everett, supra note 35, at 380-81, 388-90, 396-97.
'See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 244 (1960). But see
Everett, supra note 35. at 391 n. 102.
See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text.
IC 395 U.S. at 273.
,; Cf Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332
U.S. 469 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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In Lee v. Madigan,7 1 the Supreme Court examined the validity
of a court-martial conviction for an offense as to which the then Arti-
cle of War 92 prohibited trial by court-martial if committed "in time
of peace. "172 The crime had occurred on June 10, 1949, after
cessation of World War II hostility but prior to formal termination
of the war with either Germany or Japan. Distinguishing some
other situations where wartime legislation and controls were
deemed to remain effective until the formal establishment of peace,
the opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Douglas, concluded
that Congress had not "used 'in time of peace' in Article 92 to
deny soldiers or civilians the benefit of jury trials for capital of-
fenses four years after all hostilities had ceased.'
7 3
Although Lee v. Madigan hinged on Congressional intent, the
case would tend to limit the creating of any wartime exception to
O'Callahan. Thus, although both the Korean War and the Viet-
Nam War have been viewed as "time of war" in construing the
Uniform Code of Military Justice,17' a different result would
probably be reached as to military jurisdiction over offenses that
are not service-connected.
If any exception to O'Callahan is recognized by the Supreme 0
Court it may well require as a minimum either a formal
declaration of war or hostilities that are not limited geographically.
If, however, the existence of hostilities such as those in Viet-Nam
are sufficient to create an exception to O'Callahan under the war
power, then the exception will probably be limited to the
geographic area of those hostilities. This, in turn, would make the
exception almost academic if O'Callahan is not applied
extraterritorially.
7 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
1" 41 Stat. 805 (1920). "... no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape
committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of
Columbia in time of peace." Id.
17 358 U.S. at 236. The court distinguished cases such as Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S.
160 (1948) and Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921). See 358 U.S. at 230-32.
17See. e.g.. United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646. 23 C.M.R. 10 (1957); United
States v. Taylor, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 15 C.M.R. 232 (1954); United States v. Ayers, 4
U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954); United States v. Gann, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 12, II
C.M.R. 12 (1953); United States v. Bancroft. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, II C.M.R. 3 (1953), all
involving the Korean war; and United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R.




The sixth amendment right to trial by jury has long been
considered subject to an exception for "petty offenses.' 1 At least
for some purposes, this can include any misdemeanor for which the
maximum penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, a
fine of $500, or both.
176
In the wake of Supreme Court decisions invalidating military
jurisdiction over civilian dependents and employees, suggestions
were offered that an exception might exist for petty offenses
committed by such civilians.' It was contended that, since the
Supreme Court had sought primarily to protect the civilians' rights
to jury trial and grand jury indictment, there was no occasion for
such protection as to offenses for which these rights would not have
existed in the first place. A: similar argument might be advanced
with respect to offenses committed by service personnel which are
"petty" but not "service-connected.'1 78 Thus, offenses customarily
disposed of by Article 15 nonjudicial punishment 79 or by summary
court-martial'" could still be handled within the military justice
system.
Conceptually, however, there is difficulty with this position.
Under one reading of O'Callahan, offenses that are not service-
connected and lack military significance do not fall within the
sphere of "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces" under article one, section eight, clause fourteen
of the Constitution. In that event, and apart from the war power,
what is the constitutional basis of federal legislation designed to
punish such offenses-whether they be petty or major, whether they
be committed in the United States or abroad, and whatever may be
the forum provided for their trial?
175 See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617 (1937); Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); Frankfurter
& Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926).
'; 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964) and cases cited in note 175.
" See Everett, supra note 35.
', The Court of Military Appeals has taken this position in United States v. Sharkey,
No. 22,248 (C.M.A., Oct. 10, 1969), upholding a conviction for being drunk and disorderly in
a public place.
in 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964).
' As to jurisdiction of summary courts-martial, see Uniform Code of Military Justice,
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Service- Connection
This article's earlier criticism of the uncertain standard
provided by the principal opinion in O'Callahan v. Parker can be
incorporated by reference to avoid the need for discussing further
the myriad factors that may bear on "service-connection.'''1
Precedents existing for interpreting service-connection are so broad
that almost any offense could be included within military
jurisdiction.8 ' Thus, if the Supreme Court as now constituted is
inclined to whittle away at O'Callahan, instead of overruling it,
there is ample authority for so doing.
Exhaustion of Remedies
Almost contemporaneously with O'Callahan the Supreme Court
ruled that military remedies must be exhausted before a court-
martial conviction can be attacked in a federal civil court)'1 In so
doing, the Court distinguished in these words some of its cases
where military jurisdiction over civilians had been collaterally
attacked in the civil courts without reference to exhaustion of
military remedies:
The cited cases held that the Constitution barred the assertion of court-
martial jurisdiction over various classes of civilians connected with the
military, and it is true that this Court there vindicated petitioners' claims
without requiring exhaustion of military remedies. We did so, however,
because we did not believe that the expertise of military courts extended to
the consideration of constitutional claims of the type presented. Moreover, it
appeared especially unfair to require exhaustion of military remedies when
the petitioners raise substantial arguments denying the right of the military
to try them at all. Neither of these factors is present in the case before us."
What if a serviceman facing trial by court-martial seeks an
injunction from a federal district court on the ground that the
offense to be tried is not service-connected and therefore is outside
the jurisdiction of the court-martial? Does this constitutional claim
bring into play "the expertise of military courts?" Is this a
situation where it is "unfair" to require the accused to stand trial
art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964). See also Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 10,
10 U.S.C. § 810(1964).
"' See notes 73-84 supra and accompanying text.
IN2 Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); text accompanying note 76 supra.
" Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
"I d. at 696 n.8.
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before a court-martial which may not have jurisdiction? And are
there remedies within the military justice system itself which might
be used to forestall the trial by court-martial?"" Complicating the
problem is the fact that, under the liberal joinder procedure
permitted in military trials, an offense clearly military in nature
might be joined for trial with one as to which service-connection is
tenuous.
Impact on the Military Lawyer
The principal opinion in O'Callahan had its initial impact upon
military lawyers by seeming to downgrade their profession: It was
anticipated by some that the decision might ultimately obviate the
need for many military lawyers.1 86 Instead, the converse now seems
true. The task of the military lawyer has been complicated by
introducing a new and currently unpredictable issue into many
otherwise routine cases. Except in the trial of a clearly military
offense, such as unauthorized absence, the Government must
introduce evidence to establish that the offense is service-connected;
and the defense will often contest the point. Thus, while the total
number of cases tried by court-martial should diminish, the time
and effort involved per case may well increase. Moreover, collateral
attacks on the jurisdiction of courts-martial to try particular
offenses will add further responsibilities for the military lawyer.
Meanwhile, especially in areas where military installations are
located, the dockets of civil courts will be further congested, with
added annoyance for all concerned. The only consolation may be
the reduction of occasions for arguments whether a serviceman can
"I I have discussed some of these problems in more detail in Everett, Collateral Attack on
Court-Martial Convictions, 11 A.F. JAG L. REv. - (1969). Apparently there is a
remedy within the military justice system itself. See Fleiner v. Koch, Misc. No. 69-47
(C.M.A., writ of prohibition granted Oct. 7, 1969). In at least one case, a federal district
judge has enjoined proceedings where he considered that the offense to be tried was not within
military jurisdiction. Moylan v. Laird, C.A. File No. 4179 (D.R.I., Oct. 20, 1969).
I" Questions were raised at a congressional hearing on appropriations as to whether the
Army would have a diminished need for judge advocates because of the O'Callahan case.
Hearing by Real Estate Subcommittee. House Armed Services Committee on July 10, 1969,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 168 (1969).
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properly be tried by both a civil court and a court-martial for a
single criminal transgression.117
SOME CONCLUSIONS
From the tenor of all that has preceded, it can be readily
perceived that this writer does not agree with the approach of the
majority in O'Callahan v. Parker. As to the very fact of its
rendition on June 2, 1969, the intemperate nature of the criticism
of military justice, and the result ultimately reached, the principal
opinion by Justice Douglas was ill-starred. The uncertainty it has
already generated may be difficult to dispel. There are many
devices available for limiting materially the effect of O'Callahan.
However, in preference to a gradual erosion of its strength, the
Supreme Court should take the earliest opportunity to overrule the
case.
I" This issue would have been before the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Borys,
18 U.S.C.M.A.'545, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969), had the court not ruled that the offenses involved
were not service-connected and so were beyond military jurisdiction. As to the relation between
military and civil jurisdiction over servicemen, see Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333
(1907); R. EVERETT. supra note 24, at 38-40.
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